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Medicaid Reform

Medicaid’s open-ended financing rewards overspending and favors wealthy states, while crowding out care for the most vulnerable. The ACA worsened the problem by giving higher reimbursements for able-bodied adults. Reform is needed to restore fairness, improve efficiency, and refocus Medicaid on truly low-income patients.

Medicaid Reform

Medicaid’s open-ended financing rewards overspending and favors wealthy states, while crowding out care for the most vulnerable. The ACA worsened the problem by giving higher reimbursements for able-bodied adults. Reform is needed to restore fairness, improve efficiency, and refocus Medicaid on truly low-income patients.

The GOP can make the strong and accurate argument that fixing this bias in federal payments is shoring up the program to better serve the vulnerable. Paragon Health Institute, a think tank, has done the intellectual leg work for the GOP and rolled out proposals to rationalize the payment treatment over time.
–The Wall Street Journal Editorial Board

Americans Want Common Sense Medicaid Reforms

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Paragon Health Policy Survey 2025

The results of our survey indicate that voters do not see a conflict between Medicaid reform and protecting the most vulnerable. Across party lines, Americans overwhelmingly support policies that prioritize children, pregnant women, seniors, and the disabled and that root out waste, fraud, and abuse.

Stopping Medicaid Money Laundering

Stopping Medicaid Money Laundering

Ending the Discrimination Against the Most Vulnerable

Eliminating Schemes that Put Illegal Immigrants on Medicaid

Paragon Pics

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In 2025, Over 90% of SDP Spending in TX and AZ Scheduled for Non-Rural Hospitals

Hospital lobbyists argued that the reforms to provider taxes and state-directed payments (SDPs) in the One Big Beautiful Bill (OBBB) would decimate rural providers. For example, the National Rural Health Association (NRHA), in its comment on CMS’s proposed rule implementing the OBBB’s SDP provision, stated it would “disproportionately harm rural hospitals and jeopardize Medicaid enrollee access to care in rural communities.” This claim has often been repeated in the media without evidence.

In this analysis, we examine publicly available provider-specific scheduled SDP payments in Texas and Arizona in 2025 and show that in both states, more than 90 percent of SDP payments were for non-rural providers. This is consistent with a recent study by the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE) at the US Department of Health and Human Services, which found that only 5 percent of SDP funds in 2025 went to rural inpatient hospitals.

  • Using the 2025 Federal Office of Rural Health Policy (FORHP) hospital-site designation, rural providers account for 2 percent of spending under Texas’s principal hospital SDP, CHIRP, and 8.3 percent under Arizona’s principal hospital SDP, HEALTHII. The figures describe what the hospitals were scheduled to receive under these SDPs. They do not reflect final cash receipts, all hospital SDPs in either state, or hospitals’ net gain accounting for their financing contributions through Medicaid provider taxes or IGTs. Texas and Arizona use different annual windows. Both Pics use the same FORHP definition.
  • We also examined whether those numbers changed under different definitions of rurality. Texas’s rural share did not change significantly under different definitions (2.3 percent and 2 percent under Texas’s and the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) respective definitions). However, Arizona’s rural share varied more under different definitions (19 percent and 4.4 percent under Arizona’s and the USDA’s respective definitions).
  • We also examined spending per available hospital bed to see if differences in hospital capacity could explain the heavy skew toward non-rural providers. We found that Texas still spent more per available hospital bed on non-rural providers than rural providers, while Arizona spent more per bed on rural providers than non-rural providers.

Methodology

We selected Texas and Arizona because each publishes a hospital-level fiscal year 2025 schedule that can be checked against individual providers. They are illustrative cases, not a representative sample of states. AI assisted the data preparation and chart production. We manually checked a sample of its calculations and found no errors.

Texas: Rural Providers Account for 3.2% of Scheduled Hospital SDP Dollars in 2025
Texas SDPs

For Texas, we examined each hospital’s scheduled payments under the state’s Comprehensive Hospital Increase Reimbursement Program (CHIRP), which Texas describes as its “statewide program that increases Medicaid payments to hospitals for inpatient and outpatient services provided to persons with Medicaid.” CHIRP has three components: Uniform Hospital Rate Increase Payment (UHRIP), Average Commercial Incentive Award (ACIA), and Alternate Participating Hospital Reimbursement for Improving Quality Award (APHRIQA). The state posts projected payments for all three components in its Final Payment (SFY2025) Scorecard under “APHRIQA Scorecards.”

Between September 1, 2024 and August 31, 2025, CHIRP was scheduled to spend $6.05 billion (out of $6.48 billion it was approved to spend). We calculated this total by combining the projected UHRIP and ACIA amounts with updated figures for the APHRIQA. The updated APHRIQA figures include interim payments reported as having been received and final payments or recoveries calculated after hospitals’ quality results were known. These figures replace the preliminary APHRIQA estimate to avoid double counting. Because UHRIP and ACIA remain projections, the combined total is not a final accounting of actual payments. Texas has other directed payment programs, but they serve different provider types or lack comparable provider-level spending data, so we excluded them from the analysis.

Arizona: Rural Providers Account for 8.3% of Scheduled Hospital SDP Dollars in 2025
Arizona SDPs

Our data for Arizona covered the Hospital Enhanced Access Leading to Health Improvements Initiative (HEALTHII) model for October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025. Across 117 providers, it lists $3.031 billion in SDP payments (out of $3.09 billion it was approved to spend). Arizona used its 2023 hospital claims to estimate its base payments in 2025, adding an allowance for claims not yet reported but assuming no growth in hospital use between 2023 and 2025. Provider amounts could change with actual FY2025 managed-care utilization and final reconciliation.

Arizona has other less costly SDPs that were not included in our analysis because there were no publicly available provider-level estimates that would have permitted a rural/urban comparison. These programs seem targeted to non-rural hospitals, including some examples that seemed to target single providers located in the urban area of Phoenix.

  • The Safety Net Services Initiative (SNSI) is an SDP that was approved by CMS to spend $388.5 million on “the eligible public safety net hospital established by the state for inpatient and outpatient hospital services.” That hospital is Valleywise, Maricopa County Special Health Care District, located in the city of Phoenix.
  • Another SDP that seems directed towards just one provider is the Pediatric Services Initiative (PSI), which was approved to provide $59.12 million “for inpatient and outpatient hospital services at freestanding children’s hospitals with more than 100 licensed pediatric beds.” It seems directed to Phoenix Children’s Hospital (PCH). The City of Phoenix’s summary of its June 18, 2025, Formal Meeting described PSI as “a partnership between the City of Phoenix, AHCCCS and PCH” and that its purpose “is to help provide financial sustainability to PCH as one of the country’s largest and busiest pediatric systems.”

Another major SDP that we excluded is Arizona’s Access to Professional Services Initiative (APSI), which was approved to provide $310.4 million in payments to hospitals based on professional services. We excluded this SDP from our analysis because the state did not publicly disclose provider-specific payments. However, one AHCCCS document from before 2022 listed 11 hospitals as APSI recipients. While it is unclear whether those providers have changed, none of those 11 hospitals are considered rural under any of the definitions we used.

Rural vs. Non-Rural Classification

Both analyses classify each hospital under the 2025 Federal Office of Rural Health Policy (FORHP) rural designation, as compiled by UNC Sheps Center. For any unmatched sites, we used the Health Resources and Services Administration’s (HRSA) rural-area point lookup to find the correct FORHP classification.

In addition to the FORHP, we also considered two other rural vs. non-rural definitions. First, we looked at the states’ own designations (Texas CHIRP’s own provider classes and a limited Arizona AHCCCS APR-DRG/RHIF category schedule). Second, we used the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) 2023 county metro/non-metro codes.

Findings

Under FORHP 2025, 136 Texas CHIRP rows classified rural account for $191.6 million of $6.050 billion (3.2 percent). Seventeen Arizona HEALTHII rows classified rural account for $252.7 million of $3.031 billion (8.3 percent). The other 247 Texas and 100 Arizona rows are non-rural under this site designation. All 383 Texas and 117 Arizona provider rows, including zero-dollar rows, remain in the denominators. None has an unknown FORHP class.

Numbers Using Different Definitions of Rural

We also examined how the results changed under different definitions of rural. Texas’s results changed little, while Arizona’s varied more substantially. Texas’s rural designation under CHIRP yields 2.3 percent. Using USDA’s county metro/non-metro classification, non-metro hospitals account for 2.2 percent of selected dollars.

While Arizona’s rural share under USDA (4.4 percent) was smaller than its share using the FORHP definition, the state’s own definitions showed a much higher percentage of rural providers. Under Arizona’s own designations, contained in a separate limited AHCCCS APR-DRG/RHIF schedule, rural hospitals account for $576.6 million (19.0 percent) while $117.8 million (3.9 percent) went to hospitals with unknown state-category status. The schedule’s “All Other” category is not proof of a non-rural location.

These sensitivity shares all use the full state selected-dollar totals, including unknown classifications.

Adjustment for Hospital Size

One possible explanation for the patterns we observe is that non-rural providers receive larger SDP payments because they serve more patients. To account for capacity differences, we also examined spending per available hospital bed. These numbers were taken from hospitals’ Medicare cost reports only for providers that had full-year Medicare cost reports and known geography (about 99.6 percent of selected Texas dollars and 98.3 percent of Arizona dollars).

The denominator is all available beds, not Medicaid patient volume. Also, some cost-report periods do not coincide with the SDP year.

We found that even adjusting for hospital beds, Texas SDP spending was still significantly skewed towards non-rural providers, while the opposite was true in Arizona. In the separate matched comparison using USDA non-metro/metro county status, rural dollars per average available bed were about $33,300 versus $102,600 for metro Texas hospitals, but about $504,800 versus $181,500 in Arizona.

These findings only describe selected gross provider allocations before provider taxes or intergovernmental financing. They do not show whether provider taxes help or hurt any individual hospital, whether all rural hospitals participate, or how the OBBB’s reforms will change access or employment.

CONCLUSION

These findings are relevant for both the SDP reforms and the changes to provider taxes in the OBBB. As Paragon has previously written, states often combine SDPs with provider taxes. They first use provider taxes to raise funds from providers, then use SDPs to pay providers back while triggering larger infusions of federal Medicaid money. Both the state and providers often net even greater funds (see this video explaining the financing mechanism).

The fact that states skew their resources towards non-rural providers adds another piece to the puzzle of why states with provider taxes experience decreased rural hospital employment, as research by Liam Sigaud and Niklas Kleinworth found. That decrease in provider-tax states happened even though the authors found no corresponding decline among urban hospitals. Our finding provides one possible explanation for this seeming contradiction: states direct nearly all their Medicaid SDP dollars towards non-rural hospitals.

Ultimately, Congress and the Administration are right to focus their efforts to reform these payments and stop diverting resources from the most vulnerable populations.

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Prescription Drug Prices Drop Even Faster Than in First Trump Administration—Hospital Price Inflation Still Hot

The media described the Consumer Price Index (CPI) report for July as showing inflation cooling for the second month in a row. One major exception is hospital prices, which continue to rise rapidly. Hospitals account for 31 percent of health spending, and prices for inpatient and outpatient services rose 5.2 percent and 5.9 percent respectively over the past year, nearly on par with what we found in last year’s Paragon PIC discussing inflation for the twelve months through July 2025. Prices for physician services grew about one and a half percentage points slower than prices for all items less medical care.

Most remarkable is the significant decline in prescription drug prices, a drop of 3.1 percent over the last twelve months—the largest decline in over six decades.1 Although retail prescription drugs only account for 9 percent of health spending, this is a welcome trend. It’s also reminiscent of the first Trump term. In the March 2019 Economic Report of the President, the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) explained that “For the first time in 46 years, the Consumer Price Index for prescription drugs fell in both nominal and real terms during a calendar year” (p. 198). The CEA showed that prescription drug prices had been increasing about five percentage points faster than Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) from 2013 to the end of 2016. Beginning in 2017, they grew by only one percentage point faster than PCE (p. 236, fig. 4.7).2

The figure shows that the fall in drug prices started in February 2026. One notable development that month was the launch of TrumpRx, the Administration’s direct-to-consumer (DTC) website where patients can buy discounted medicines. TrumpRx launched with 43 branded medicines available and has since added many more drugs, so that it now offers over 800 medicines.

TrumpRx is a storefront that operates through vendors like GoodRx, Mark Cuban’s Cost Plus Pharmacy, and manufacturers’ own discount programs. These cash-pay channels bypass many of the “middlemen” that drive up drug prices and have gradually increased their own market share, up to about 9 percent of transactions in 2022. Even patients who have insurance coverage for outpatient drugs often find it less expensive to pay cash.

According to one market expert, “As cash-pay prices appear on a federally promoted platform, a new layer of public transparency sets in. Patient expectations around what a drug should cost could begin to anchor around those figures, creating internal pressure on manufacturers to rationalize the relationships between list price, net price, and DTC price.” Another industry insider credits a clarification from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Inspector General that manufacturers can sell directly to Medicare and Medicaid enrollees without triggering the Anti-Kickback Statute.

The benefit of DTC is most apparent with GLP-1s, the anti-obesity medications that have become very widely used. GLP-1s were among the first drugs available on TrumpRx in February, and the Administration also launched a demonstration called BRIDGE that allows Medicare beneficiaries to access them for a $50 copay. However, Medicare Part D insurers cover GLP-1s for diabetes or some other conditions but not obesity alone. Only 36 percent of employer-sponsored plans cover GLP-1 drugs for obesity—usually only with prior authorization—and that share is falling. The result is that the market for GLP-1 drugs is a consumer-driven market.

It is too early to estimate how much of the recent drug price reduction can be attributed to DTC platforms like TrumpRx. Since generics account for more than 90 percent of prescriptions, the steady approval of generic applications (particularly first generics) is an important driver of lower prices.  Others are attributing a portion of the decline to the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). Medicare implemented negotiated prices for the first ten drugs subject to the IRA ­in January 2026. However, the timing and persistence of the decline make it difficult to attribute much of the trend to the IRA. The first negotiated prices took effect at a single point in January and applied to only ten drugs, but there was no significant price reduction that month, and the negotiated prices would not have kept trending down.

The precise causes of the historic decline in prescription drug prices will take time to disentangle, but consumers are clearly benefiting from greater competition and new ways to purchase medicines. The contrast with hospital care is striking: while drug prices are falling at their fastest rate in decades, hospital prices continue their relentless rise.

Footnotes

1↑ The accuracy of the CPI for prescription drugs is limited by a two-year lag in the basket of drugs used to estimate prices. Prices for 2026 are based on a basket of drugs available in 2024, and many new drugs are introduced every year. Prices represent transaction prices between the pharmacy, patient, and third-party payer, if applicable. The index excludes prices for prescriptions with no patient payment, such as hospital inpatient services or outpatient infusions or injections.
2↑ PCE and CPI are different measures of inflation produced by different federal agencies, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) in the Department of Commerce (PCE) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in the Department of Labor (CPI). The PCE is mostly compiled from business surveys and the CPI from consumer surveys. The PCE responds more quickly to substitution because it uses a chain-weighted index. So, when consumers switch to less expensive goods, it is reflected in the next month. The BLS updates the basket of goods and services in the CPI annually, with a two-year lag. (The 2026 CPI uses 2024 weights.)
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Health Care Spending Continues to Outpace the Economy

Earlier this summer, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) released its latest National Health Expenditures projections, and the outlook is alarming. National health spending is growing at more than 7 percent annually—about two percentage points faster than GDP. When health care consistently grows faster than the economy, it consumes an ever-larger share of national income. CMS projects that health care spending will exceed one-fifth of the U.S. economy early in the next decade.

Much of this growth reflects expanding federal involvement in health care. During the Biden administration, Medicaid enrollment increased dramatically because of pandemic-era continuous eligibility requirements, ACA subsidy expansions, and widespread improper enrollment in both Medicaid and the ACA exchanges. At the same time, states increasingly exploited financing arrangements such as Medicaid state-directed payments to draw down additional federal matching funds, largely to fund corporate welfare for large, politically powerful hospital systems.

Hospital services are the largest driver of spending growth. Hospital expenditures increased 8.9 percent in 2024 and are projected to rise another 8.2 percent in 2025—both well above overall health care spending. As John R. Graham documented in recent Paragon research, hospitals remain the least efficient major sector of American health care, yet they continue to command an ever-larger share of national health spending through market consolidation, government payment policies, and regulatory advantages. These trends reinforce the urgent need for reforms that promote competition, transparency, and more efficient delivery of care.

The implications extend well beyond health policy. Despite historically high federal revenues, annual budget deficits continue to approach $2 trillion because federal spending continues to rise even faster. In a 2023 Paragon research paper, Paul Winfree—now an advisor to Federal Reserve Chairman Kevin Warsh—explained how rapidly growing federal health care programs, together with rising interest costs on the national debt, are steadily consuming America’s fiscal space and limiting policymakers’ ability to respond to future economic, fiscal, and national security challenges. The latest National Health Expenditures projections reinforce that warning.

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Medicaid Managed Care Now Accounts for the Majority of Medicaid Spending

This PIC shows the growth in Medicaid managed care over a 25-year period from 1999 through 2024. By 2021, Medicaid managed care accounted for more than half of all Medicaid spending. In 1999, payments to managed care organizations (MCOs) represented just 12 percent of Medicaid spending. By 2024, that share had climbed to 54 percent, roughly $490 billion of the program’s $909 billion in total outlays. The figure traces this transformation, with managed care spending (dark blue) steadily displacing traditional fee-for-service and other Medicaid spending (light blue). The trajectory steepens notably after the passage of the Affordable Care Act in 2010, with a further steepening after the ACA Medicaid expansion took effect in 2014. As we have previously shown, the ACA has been very profitable for health insurance companies.

This dramatic shift raises an important question: Has Medicaid managed care actually worked? When states began moving enrollees into MCOs, advocates argued that private insurers would coordinate care better, curb unnecessary spending, and improve quality. Yet after three decades of expansion, the evidence remains remarkably weak. The Congressional Budget Office found no consistent evidence that managed care improves outcomes, and a recent paper by Chris Pope of the Manhattan Institute concludes the case for managed care is thin.

Oversight has also failed to keep pace. Nearly half of MCO filings are incomplete, and medical loss ratio rules meant to keep spending on care rather than profit go largely unenforced. Meanwhile, state-directed payments, which are large payments that states make to hospitals through MCOs, ballooned from two states in 2016 to a projected $124 billion across 39 states by 2025. State-directed payments increasingly functioning as corporate welfare to politically powerful providers. The One Big Beautiful Bill capped these payments at Medicare rates. While those reforms are important, there are additional reforms needed to bring greater transparency and accountability to Medicaid MCOs.

Other Related Content

Related Glossary Terms

Supplemental Payments
A Medicaid supplemental payment is a lump sum payment paid by the Medicaid program to a health care provider in addition to Medicaid payments for specific health care services that have been rendered. These payments are largely received by hospitals and include DSH payments, upper payment limit (UPL) payments, uncompensated care pool (UCP) payments, and delivery system reform incentive (DSRIP) payments. By 2019, these payments grew to 17.5 percent of total Medicaid spending and 27 percent of Medicaid spending on hospitals. The growth in supplemental payments increases lobbying with government officials having discretion to award large Medicaid payments, payments consisting mostly or entirely…
Medicaid Expansion
Medicaid expansion is the Affordable Care Act’s change to broaden Medicaid program eligibility and increase the number of people who qualify for the program. A major component of this expanded eligibility for state Medicaid programs was eligibility for a new category of people—able-bodied, working-age, and generally childless adults. The ACA created a much higher FMAP for this category—equal to 100 percent from 2014-2016, gradually declining until it reached 90 percent in 2020, where it is scheduled to remain. This FMAP policy incentivized states to expand Medicaid because most of the budgetary costs for the population of expanded enrollees were paid…
Federal Medical Assistance Percentage
The Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) is the statutory percentage of Medicaid expenditures paid by the federal government. For traditional Medicaid enrollees (low-income pregnant women, children, seniors, and individuals with disabilities), the FMAP is largely a function of state per capita income as states with lower per capita income receive a higher FMAP. No state receives an FMAP below 50 percent. For Medicaid expansion enrollees, the FMAP is equal to 90 percent. The actual percentage of Medicaid expenditures paid by the federal government is substantially higher than the FMAP since states employ numerous accounting gimmicks and financial schemes to minimize…
Average Commercial Rate
The average commercial rate (ACR) refers to the mean payment amount for a medical service as determined by leading commercial insurers’ reimbursement rates for the same service. The ACR may be used to define the maximum limit of a state Medicaid program’s supplemental payments to health care providers that are in excess of the state’s Medicaid standard rates. HHS guidance on ACR payments states when provider payment “is made up to the ACR states must submit data from the top (generally five) third party payers and provide a full explanation of the data that was extracted from providers’ accounts receivable…

Issue Experts

Brian Blase
President at Paragon Health Institute

Brian Blase, Ph.D., is the President of Paragon Health Institute. Brian was Special Assistant to the President for Economic Policy at the White House’s National Economic Council (NEC) from 2017-2019, where he coordinated the development and execution of numerous health policies and advised the President, NEC director, and senior officials. After leaving the White House, Brian founded Blase Policy Strategies and served as its CEO.

Gary Alexander
Director Medicaid and Health Safety Net Reform Initiative at Paragon Health Institute

A nationally recognized health services expert and government reformer, Gary D. Alexander was head of the Medicaid and Health Safety Net Initiative at the Paragon Health Institute from October 2021 to October 2025.

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