Paragon Health Institute Icon White

Trump Administration’s Affordable Care Act Program Integrity and Affordability Rule

1AW HHS Plaque0
Brian Blase
President at Paragon Health Institute

Brian Blase, Ph.D., is the President of Paragon Health Institute. Brian was Special Assistant to the President for Economic Policy at the White House’s National Economic Council (NEC) from 2017-2019, where he coordinated the development and execution of numerous health policies and advised the President, NEC director, and senior officials. After leaving the White House, Brian founded Blase Policy Strategies and served as its CEO.

Chris Medrano 20240917 Headshot SQUARE

Chris Medrano is the Legal Research Analyst at the Paragon Health Institute. His work focuses on administrative rule making and policy analysis. Previously, he served as a Legislative Assistant to Senator Mike Lee (R-UT), where he managed the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) portfolio, including legislative reforms for the FDA and CMS. Before that, Chris was a Health Policy Fellow for Representative Tim Walberg (R-MI). He holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and English from James Madison University and is currently pursuing a Juris Doctor at George Mason University’s Antonin Scalia Law School.

Key Takeaways

  • The proposal is projected to lower ACA premiums by five percent or more,1 reduce improper enrollment by a million or more people, and reduce deficits by $150 billion over a decade, making it one of the most fiscally responsible regulatory actions in American history.2
  • This proposed rule reverses Biden administration policies that led to massive levels of fraudulent enrollment and improper spending in the ACA exchanges, including accepting self-attested information and establishing an easily gameable special enrollment period. Paragon estimates that fraudulent exchange enrollment cost hard working Americans $15 to $26 billion in 2024 alone.3
  • The proposed provisions largely mirror the regulatory landscape that the Obama administration had either implemented or scheduled to implement, including the income verification requirements and the six-week open enrollment period.
  • In the rule, HHS confirmed Paragon’s methodology for estimating 4 to 5 million improper enrollments. By targeting improper enrollment, HHS’s mid-range projection is that this rule would result in 1.4 million fewer people with exchange coverage, many of whom likely have other sources of coverage.
  • The proposed rule further confirms that the Biden administration’s permissive approach to program integrity resulted in tens of thousands of people who were signed up for plans against their will. That includes more than 12,000 reportedly “medically urgent” complaints from Medicaid recipients who were involuntarily enrolled in ACA coverage, which blocked them from using their Medicaid coverage.
  • The proposed rule continues the harmful practice of automatic re-enrollment, which wastes billions of dollars annually and harms both the quality and price of insurance by allowing insurers to collect taxpayer dollars through enrollees’ passivity and not by justifying the value of their services.

At the start of his first term, President Trump took actions to stabilize the Affordable Care Act (ACA) exchanges, which were in freefall with skyrocketing premiums and insurers exiting in droves. In his second term, President Trump is again acting to improve the exchanges—this time a major effort to clean up the surge of fraudulent enrollment and improper spending. A new proposed rule by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is estimated to lower ACA premiums by five percent or more, reduce improper enrollment by a million or more people, and reduce deficits by $150 billion over a decade, making it one of the most fiscally responsible regulatory actions in American history.4

Most ACA exchange enrollees receive premium tax credits (PTCs) to lower the cost of health insurance premiums. The PTC, which is typically paid in advance, is generally a subsidy paid directly to the insurance company. The advance PTC (APTC) is based on the estimated annual household income reported on an enrollee’s application.

Historically, the exchange must verify the enrollee’s eligibility and income information. On their tax return, the enrollee compares their actual income to estimated income. Subject to recapture limits, enrollees either must pay back excess subsidies if they made more income than they estimated, or they may receive additional subsidies if they made less than estimated. In 2024, the repayment limit for individuals with income less than 200 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) is $375, between 200 and 300 percent FPL is $950, and between 300 and 400 percent FPL is $1,575.5

PTCs have undergone significant legislative and regulatory changes in the past few years. In 2021, Congress passed the American Rescue Plan Act, which increased the subsidies for individuals between 100 and 400 percent FPL while extending subsidies to those above 400 percent FPL for plan years 2021 and 2022. This resulted in fully taxpayer-subsidized coverage for enrollees with income between 100 and 150 percent FPL. The Inflation Reduction Act extended these policy changes through 2025. The number of enrollees claiming to be part of the 100 to 150 percent FPL income bracket (or having others filling out their applications and claiming that income for them) increased from 40.4 percent of federal exchange sign-ups in 2022 to 53.2 percent in 2024.6

During the Biden administration, HHS also loosened enrollment checks and safeguards. Along with the boosted subsidies, the loose enforcement of rules caused fraudulent and improper enrollment to skyrocket. In 2024, between 4 million and 5 million people were improperly enrolled in the 100 to 150 percent FPL fully-subsidized category, with an estimated cost to taxpayers of between $15 billion and $26 billion.7 In potentially millions of cases, brokers received commissions for signing people up for coverage or switching enrollees’ plans without their consent.8 As Paragon and others have previously written, the fact that these plans are fully subsidized provides an extra incentive, as “free” plans sell much more easily than coverage that requires the enrollee to pay even a nominal part of the premium.9

To address fraud, improve program integrity and lower premiums, HHS released its proposed Marketplace Integrity and Affordability Rule on March 9, 2025. This rule is estimated to lower premiums, significantly reduce improper enrollment, and save $150 billion over a decade.10 This brief summarizes how this rule’s provisions address three problems that resulted from the Biden administration’s lax approach to maintaining program integrity and following eligibility rules:

  1. How lack of verification made fraud easy,
  2. How the Biden administration made it difficult to remove ineligible enrollees, and
  3. How loosened enrollment periods confused consumers, raised premiums, and perpetuated fraud.

Problem 1: Lack of Verification Made Fraud Easy

Verification Process Related to Income Eligibility11

The Biden administration undermined the ACA’s guardrails by preventing exchanges from properly verifying eligibility. The ACA and previous regulations established under President Obama provided for a multistep process to verify people’s incomes to accurately determine subsidy amounts (see chart).12

Problem:
The Biden administration changed Step 1 of this process by requiring exchanges to take applicants at their word (self-attestation) if the exchanges could not verify income through a tax return.13 This created a major gap in the process because many people with lower incomes do not file tax returns.

The Biden administration also changed Step 3 of this process by requiring exchanges to automatically add an additional 60 days to the original 90 days for individuals to submit their documents if any data from Steps 1 or 2 contradicts their attested income.14 The 60-day automatic extension allows people who are ineligible to continue receiving subsidies for a longer period of time. Before this automatic extension, exchanges already had discretion to give more time if the applicant showed a good faith effort to provide the necessary documents but faced extenuating circumstances.

Furthermore, the original ACA rules still leave a major gap in Step 2 that increases fraud: if an individual says they have an income that is higher than available information indicates, the exchange must accept their attestation over the data sources.15 This has led to a significant amount of income misstatement by brokers and enrollees in order to claim household incomes that generate higher APTCs.

Solution:
The proposed rule would undo the Biden administration’s change to Step 1, which would again require individuals who do not file tax returns to go through Steps 2 and 3. Exchanges would again be required to verify that people seeking subsidies are eligible to receive them and ensure the proper amounts were advanced to insurers.

The proposed rule would also remove the automatic 60-day extension for when people fail to submit their documents. HHS did not find that the 60-day extension was necessary to help people get their documents in order, as the percentage of people with data-matching issues did not improve after it was implemented.16

Furthermore, the proposed rule would alter Step 2 by requiring exchanges to move to Step 3 in instances when an applicant attests to a higher income, but the sources indicate a lower income.17 This proposal would address a gap in current regulations that prevents further verification in cases where people have a strong incentive to inflate their incomes.

Some media outlets have portrayed the documentation requirement as overly burdensome. However, HHS estimates that it takes individuals only about an hour to complete the documentation process. And they would have 90 days to complete it.18 The Biden administration similarly estimated that the process to fill out and submit the documents would take about 45 minutes.19

HISTORICAL STEPS TO ENROLL AND RECEIVE A SUBSIDY
STEP 1: When an applicant applies for an exchange plan, the exchange seeks to verify income to determine eligibility using recent tax returns. If the applicant does not have a recent tax return or if the applicant’s stated information does not match their tax data…

STEP 2: The agency can verify income by looking up other trusted data sources for proof, including from Social Security, Homeland Security, and the Internal Revenue Service. If the other sources do not confirm that the individual is eligible or show income data that differs from what the exchange reports…

STEP 3: The individual must submit documentation. Historically, an individual would have 90 days to submit the documents. HHS has estimated that the process to fill out and submit the documents would take about one hour. If the individual does not submit documents…

STEP 4: The exchange determines eligibility for the subsidy and the advanced amount based on the information that it has. Normally, this would mean no subsidy (but the individual can still get the plan).

Problem 2: The Biden Administration Made It Hard to Remove the Ineligible, Increasing Risk of Tax Liabilities

Past-Due Premiums: Guaranteed Availability of Coverage20

Problem:
The Biden administration made it difficult for insurers to cancel plans for enrollees who do not pay their premiums. Reversing this policy would help people who have been enrolled without their knowledge and protect them from paying higher taxes as a result.

The ACA generally requires insurance companies to accept every “individual in the State [who] applies for such coverage.”21 The ACA also generally requires insurers to “renew or continue in force” a person’s coverage. However, issuers can discontinue plans of enrollees who do not pay premiums on time. The ACA’s requirements thus leave a potential window open for gaming—an individual who fails to pay for a plan could use the guaranteed issue requirement to stop paying premiums at the end of the year and then start again once the new year began. In such cases, the insurer would still have to provide coverage. HHS has found that many people are doing this.22

Such gaming hurts all enrollees because insurers raise premiums to account for premium nonpayment. To mitigate this problem, the Obama administration allowed insurers to use enrollees’ new payments to pay outstanding balances from previous years. They also allowed insurers to refuse to effectuate coverage until such individuals paid the full outstanding amounts.23 But the Obama administration applied the policy only when an individual renewed an existing plan, not when an individual selected a different plan with the same insurer or a plan from a different insurer.

The Trump administration expanded that policy during his first term by letting insurance companies apply new payments to past-due payments in cases where individuals moved to new plans with the same insurers.24

The Biden administration undid the Trump administration’s change.25 As the HHS proposed rule notes, this allowed for some people to game the system by hopping from plan to plan without paying premiums for months they were covered.26

Solution:
The proposed rule seeks to close this loophole. It would allow insurers to require new enrollees to pay their past-due premiums before their new coverage begins. If they refuse to pay, the insurers may discontinue coverage. Given that these plans come with very generous federal subsidies, this provision would be a step toward restoring program integrity. However, given insurers have a financial incentive to keep non-paying enrollees to continue receiving subsidy payments, HHS should consider a stronger alternative, such as requiring insurers to return the subsidies for such enrollees.

Failure to File Taxes and Reconcile Subsidy27

Problem:
Under both the Obama and Trump administrations, exchanges had to determine tax filers ineligible for the APTC if they received too much subsidy and failed to properly reconcile the discrepancy. That policy remained in place through 2023 and helped protect the program’s integrity.

During the Covid-19 pandemic, the Biden administration essentially stopped enforcing eligibility for ACA coverage.28 The Biden administration finalized a rule that, starting in 2024, prohibited an exchange from denying an APTC until the individual failed to pay back excess subsidies for two consecutive years.29 This policy incentivizes abuse by allowing people who improperly enroll in the exchanges to receive an extra year of subsidized coverage. HHS estimates that “18.5 percent of people [who failed to reconcile their subsidies] may be ineligible” for continued subsidies.30 The Biden administration’s policy also harms consumers who were enrolled without their knowledge, because tax liabilities can continue to accumulate for an extra year. According to the proposed rule, these tax liabilities could be significant, particularly if someone’s income ends up being higher than estimated.31

Solution:
The proposed rule would require exchanges to deem individuals as ineligible for APTCs if they do not pay back their excess subsidies for the previous year. For example, if individuals make more than they initially thought in 2026, they must pay back, or reconcile, the excess subsidies when they file their 2026 taxes, which is usually in the spring of 2027. If they fail to reconcile their subsidies for 2026, the exchanges would be required under this proposed rule to deem them ineligible for APTCs for 2028.

Redetermination32

Problem:
ACA plan enrollees originally had to verify their eligibility each year. However, the Obama and Biden administrations issued various guidance documents that undermined those processes. The Biden administration allowed exchanges to determine applicants’ eligibility by using their most recent applications, regardless of whether the applicants filed tax returns or if their tax returns showed they were not eligible for the APTCs claimed.33

Removing this verification requirement made it easier for ineligible people to stay on plans. This is particularly harmful when brokers sign up enrollees for fully subsidized health insurance without their knowledge, as it can result in significant tax liabilities. This policy impacted Medicaid beneficiaries’ access to providers. In 2024, HHS received 44,151 complaints (12,954 “medically urgent” ones) that Medicaid beneficiaries were not able to access their benefits because rogue brokers had signed them up for ACA plan without their knowledge.34 Since only a small percent of people switched are likely to file such complaints, this large number is testament to an extraordinary problem.

Solution:
The proposed rule does not adequately address this problem and needs to be strengthened in this area. The rule only requires those consumers who receive fully subsidized plans to confirm or update their eligibility or else have their subsidies reduced so that they would have to pay $5 a month. This additional step seeks to reduce fraud, because exchanges now automatically re-enroll individuals and deem them eligible based on the information in their original applications. However, the proposed rule acknowledges that this $5 amount is probably not enough to incentivize “individuals to re-confirm their income and plan.”35

This provision is woefully inadequate because it does not address automatic re-enrollment, which perpetuates substantial fraud in the exchanges and discourages individuals from regularly evaluating whether their health plans best fit their needs.

Automatic re-enrollment into heavily subsidized coverage is a recipe for wasteful and improper expenditures, particularly because the government cannot typically recover excess advanced subsidies provided to insurers. This often means that taxpayers lose thousands of dollars for enrollees whose subsidies were incorrectly determined. Moreover, automatic re-enrollment bases subsidies on data that are several years old, which is a significant program integrity risk.

Given this, CMS should end automatic re-enrollment starting for the 2026 plan year. CMS should educate policyholders about this change through multiple methods to make sure that enrollees know that they must actively provide information to be eligible to receive an APTC. This policy would not affect enrollees’ eligibility to receive a subsidy, since they would still be eligible to receive PTCs when they file their taxes. But ending automatic re-enrollment would likely save billions of dollars a year in subsidies that go to insurers that do not meet program requirements and that cannot be recaptured.

Premium Payment Thresholds36

Problem:
Federal regulations established under President Obama37 require an insurer to terminate a non-paying enrollee’s coverage after a three-month grace period. The Obama administration loosened this requirement at the insurance companies’ request by allowing them to count enrollees as having paid their entire premiums if they pay a certain net percentage of their premiums.38 This underscores a perverse dynamic in the ACA: Insurance companies financially benefit from improper enrollment because they still receive subsidies for non-paying enrollees. So even if those enrollees do not pay their portion of the premiums, insurers still benefit through their enrollment with large government payments

In 2025, just before leaving office, the Biden administration finalized a rule that people need to pay 95 percent of their net premium for the insurer to keep their coverage.39 For example, if the monthly premium is $500 and the exchange pays an APTC of $400, the net premium is $100. Under the 95 percent threshold, the enrollee must pay at least $95. The rule also gave insurance companies two additional options to keep individuals enrolled who failed to pay. Under the Biden administration rule, the insurance company can still count an enrollee as having paid their premium if (1) the individual owes less than the fixed dollar premium threshold of $10 or (2) the individual has paid 98 percent of the gross premium after the subsidy. These payment options make it easier for people to stay enrolled in coverage for months before the insurer is required to end their enrollment.40

This policy wastes taxpayer funds and hurts some Americans because, as the proposed rule notes, “improper enrollments remain undetected, since the enrollee is less likely to receive invoices, and a delinquency.”41 HHS notes that consumers are increasingly complaining that they have been signed up without their consent (7,134 consumer complaints of improper enrollments in December 2024 compared to 5,032 in December 2023).42

Solution:
The proposed rule would reverse the Biden administration’s two additional options that allowed issuers to keep non-paying customers on the exchanges for longer periods of time. However, it would maintain the Biden administration’s threshold of 95 percent.43 Overall, the proposal would increase program integrity by reducing the number of enrollees who can simply stay on the exchanges without taking action while helping to protect those who were signed up without their consent from accumulating greater tax liabilities or preventing them from accessing other forms of coverage.

Problem 3: Loose Enrollment Periods Confused Consumers, Raised Premiums, Allowed Fraud

The ACA limits enrollment periods to an annual open enrollment period and special enrollment period for significant life events. These limits are important, because the ACA requires insurers to offer coverage to any applicant without the ability to charge people more if they are sick. If people can sign up for insurance at any time, they may wait until they get sick to buy insurance, which would raise premiums overall.
The Biden administration expanded the open enrollment period and created new special enrollment periods that are prone to abuse. These policies confuse consumers, raise premiums by encouraging individuals to wait until they get sick to enroll, and exacerbate improper enrollment.

Open Enrollment Period44

Problem:
In 2021, President Biden expanded the ACA open enrollment period by one month. However, this open enrollment period is confusing because, in practice, it is two open enrollment periods. Coverage starts on January 1st for people who enroll between November 1 and December 15. But coverage does not start until February 1 for those who sign up during the second period, from December 15 to January 15.45 This difference is not always clear to consumers, so some people who enroll after December 15 are surprised when their coverage does not start until February.46

Solution:
The proposed rule would restore the open enrollment period to November 1 through December 15,47 the same period that the Obama administration had envisioned.48

In March 2016, the Obama administration issued a rule that scheduled an open enrollment period from November 1 to December 15 starting for the 2019 coverage year. The Obama administration’s rule stated many of the same reasons as the Trump administration’s new rule, including that a month and a half is adequate time for consumers to enroll.49 In 2017, the Trump administration sped up the implementation of the Obama administration’s rule, and for the 2018 through 2021 open enrollment periods, the period was from November 1 to December 15. The proposed rule notes that “consumer casework volumes related to coverage start dates and inadvertent dual enrollment decreased … suggesting that the [six-week period improved] consumer experience, as well as program integrity.”50

This shortened period would reduce consumer confusion and better align with the open enrollment periods used in the employer market and Medicare Advantage. HHS also estimates it would lower premiums due to less adverse selection.51

Special Enrollment Periods52

Problem:
The Biden administration created easily gameable special enrollment periods (SEPs) and removed requirements for individuals to verify eligibility for all but one SEP.53 The combination of these two policies exacerbated improper enrollments and fraudulent spending.

One SEP was particularly vulnerable to abuse. In 2022, the Biden administration eliminated the pre-enrollment verification requirement for SEPs in both federal and state exchanges 54 and gave states that use the federal exchange the option of providing a SEP for individuals whose incomes are between 100 and 150 percent FPL.55 State exchanges could also establish this SEP, with some such as Colorado56 limiting it to new enrollees while others such as New Jersey expanding it57 using state funds.58 In 2024, the Biden administration made this SEP permanent in states that use the federal exchange.59 SEPs were intended for people who experience substantial life events that require them to change coverage. But having a certain income is not a life-changing event like having a child or losing a job, so creating an SEP for an entire income range was a clear overreach and out of step with the ACA’s structure.60

The 100 to 150 percent FPL SEP is particularly vulnerable to improper enrollment and fraud, because the expanded subsidies already encourage more people to claim that their incomes fall into this range. HHS notes that in the first three months of implementing the 150 percent FPL SEP in 2024, the number of consumer complaints about improper enrollment or plan switching skyrocketed from only a “handful” to 50,000 for improper enrollments and 40,000 for unauthorized plan switches.61 This SEP also encourages those who are eligible to wait until they get sick to sign up for coverage. HHS estimates that this SEP raises premiums by between 0.5 and 3.6 percent.62

Solution:
The proposed rule would eliminate the SEP for individuals who earn between 100 and 150 percent FPL63 and would require exchanges to first verify eligibility for at least 75 percent of new enrollees using most SEPs.64 These changes would apply to both state and federal exchanges, as they should. HHS notes that the requirement for eligibility verification would apply to only 75 percent of new enrollees to give exchanges greater flexibility.65

This proposal builds on an Obama administration rule that scheduled a pre-enrollment verification pilot program for 50 percent of new SEP enrollees.66 In the proposed rule, the administration estimates that the pre-enrollment verification process would take an hour for a consumer to complete.67

HHS expects that both SEP policies would reduce premiums by improving the risk pool.68 The proposed rule states that eliminating the 100 to 150 FPL SEP will reduce premiums by as much as 3.6 percent69 and the pre-enrollment verification would reduce premiums by 0.5 to 1.0 percent for the 2026 plan year and 1.0 to 2.0 percent for the 2027 plan year.70

Other Provisions

In addition to the provisions specifically aimed at improper enrollment and fraud, the new proposed rule includes several other provisions.

Re-enrollment hierarchy71

The proposed rule would remove the requirement that automatically terminates an enrollee’s bronze plan if a cheaper silver plan is available, returning to the policy in place under Presidents Obama and Trump.72 The Biden administration changed the re-enrollment regulations to automatically move a bronze plan enrollee into a silver plan if the silver plan has a lower premium.73 This violates enrollees’ agency and could lead to some individuals accumulating surprise tax liabilities if they must pay back some of their subsidies.74 The proposed rule indicates repealing this provision in regulation would prevent individuals from accumulating surprise tax liabilities.

Definition of “lawfully present”75

The rule would update the definition of lawfully present to exclude recipients of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). Currently, the ACA states that individuals who are not “lawfully present” in the United States are ineligible to enroll in ACA plans or receive subsidies.76 Since 2012, both the Obama and Trump administrations interpreted the term lawfully present to exclude individuals under the DACA program. President Biden reversed this policy in 2024.77 States are currently litigating whether HHS can enforce that rule.78

Evidence standard for terminating agents, brokers agreements79

Currently, HHS can terminate a broker’s agreement only “for cause.” To address increased complaints of rogue brokers signing people up for coverage, this proposed rule clarifies that HHS will review broker terminations by applying a “preponderance of the evidence” standard.80 This standard of evidence would make it easier for HHS to terminate brokers’ agreements.81 The proposed rule notes that courts generally use a “preponderance of evidence” standard in most civil cases, which is easier to meet than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard that courts apply in criminal cases.82

Sex trait modification83

This provision would prohibit plans on the ACA from covering sex-trait modifications as an essential health benefit.84 HHS cites concerns “about the scientific integrity of claims made to support their use in health care settings.” This proposal reflects the Trump administration’s efforts to reduce federal funding for sex change procedures and treatments.85

Premium Adjustment Percentage Index (PAPI)86

This provision would update the method that HHS uses to calculate the PAPI, which determine inflation updates to parameters, such as the maximum out-of-pocket limits on cost sharing and the amounts employers must pay for certain plans.87 The ACA requires the HHS secretary to determine these amounts based on the “average per capita premium for health insurance in the United States.”88 The Obama administration chose to calculate the PAPI by using only the employer-based insurance market premiums, excluding individual insurance market premiums. This method meant that PTCs increased much more significantly over time. However, the Obama administration stated that it would consider using both markets in the future.89 This new rule would better align with the statute’s plain language by including both the individual market and the employer market in that calculation and would appropriately reduce taxpayer costs.

De minimis thresholds for actuarial value90

This proposed rule would allow for more flexible thresholds for plans’ actuarial values.91 A plan’s actuarial value (AV) refers to the expected amount of medical claims covered by the plan. For example, bronze plans—which are required to have an AV of 60 percent—pay 60 percent of the average enrollees’ medical costs. Presidents Obama and Trump expanded the de minimis range. During his first term, President Trump expanded the de minimis range to give insurance companies greater flexibility to design plans benefits. This policy led to a decrease in premiums and permitted more HSA-eligible plans on the exchanges, giving people additional plan options. The Biden administration restricted the de minimis range for all metal tiers, causing higher premiums. The proposed rule would again expand the AV de minimis variation, which will allow greater plan flexibility and lower premiums.92

Impact Analysis

HHS’s proposed rule would lower premiums, reduce improper enrollments, and correct various Biden-era policies that pursued an enrollment-at-any-cost strategy. The impact analysis in the rule confirmed Paragon’s methodology that estimated between 4 million and 5 million improper exchange enrollees. While allowing the enhanced subsidies to expire would reduce improper enrollment the most, this rule would significantly improve program integrity by reinstating commonsense protections around eligibility.

HHS projects that this proposed rule would reduce exchange enrollment by between 750,000 and 2 million individuals.93 However, many of the individuals who lose coverage because of this rule’s greater guardrails are fraudulently enrolled or have other sources of coverage. As the Congressional Budget Office notes, the number of individuals with multiple sources of coverage skyrocketed after Congress expanded the ACA subsidies—from 18 million in 2021 to 29 million in 2023.94 Given what is known about the ACA’s lack of verification, those groups strongly overlap.

The Biden administration pursued a reckless fiscal policy that significantly increased debt, interest rates, and inflation.95 This rule reverses many of those policies and thus has significant savings (estimated at $150 billion over a decade), which will lower future interest rates and inflation. Rules that reduce fiscal costs also reduce the deadweight loss of taxation, which harms Americans by reducing economic activity. The Biden administration sought to maximize enrollment by neglecting the rules and turning a blind eye to fraud and improper activity. In contrast, this proposed rule is an example of responsible governing and would help restore the ACA to the law Congress passed in 2010.

Footnotes

1 This is an estimate based on the proposed rule’s quantitative estimates for gross premiums. Provisions that reduce premiums include eliminating the 100 percent to 150 percent SEP (3-4 percent, SEP pre-enrollment verification (“0.5-1.0 percent for PY 2026 and 1.0-2.0 percent for PY 2027”), and the de minimis actuarial value threshold (a 1 percent premium decrease). HHS estimates two other provisions could reduce premiums but did not quantify the impacts: EHB sex trait modification and the Open Enrollment Period. 90 Fed. Reg. 13025, based on upper bound estimates in Table 17.
2 CMS, Proposed Rule: "Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Marketplace Integrity and Affordability," 13025. Numbers based on the midpoint of the lower and upper bound estimates in tables 16 and 17.
3 Brian Blase and Drew Gonshorowski, "The Great Obamacare Enrollment Fraud," Paragon Health Institute, June 2024, https://paragoninstitute.org/private-health/the-great-obamacare-enrollment-fraud/
4 CMS, Proposed Rule: "Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Marketplace Integrity and Affordability," 13025. Numbers based on the midpoint of the lower and upper bound estimates in tables 16 and 17.
5 Internal Revenue Service, "Internal Revenue Bulletin: 2023-48," November 27, 2023, https://www.irs.gov/irb/2023-48_IRB
7 Brian Blase and Drew Gonshorowski, "The Great Obamacare Enrollment Fraud," Paragon Health Institute, June 2024, https://paragoninstitute.org/private-health/the-great-obamacare-enrollment-fraud/
8 Julie Appleby, "Rising Complaints of Unauthorized Obamacare Plan-Switching and Sign-Ups Trigger Concern," KFF Health News, April 8, 2024, https://kffhealthnews.org/news/article/aca-unauthorized-obamacare-plan-switching-concern/
9 Blase Blase and Gabrielle Kalisz, "Unpacking the Great Obamacare Enrollment Fraud: How the Exchanges Became the Wild West," Paragon Health Institute, August 2024, https://paragoninstitute.org/private-health/unpacking-the-great-obamacare-enrollment-fraud/
10 CMS, "Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Marketplace Integrity and Affordability," 90 Fed. Reg. 12942 (Mar. 19, 2025), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/03/19/2025-04083/patient-protection-and-affordable-care-act-marketplace-integrity-and-affordability
11 These provisions include changes to §§ 155.305, 155.315, and 155.320.
12 ACA §§ 1411-1414; regulations codified at 45 C.F.R. § 155.315.
13 This exception currently stands in 45 C.F.R. § 155.320 (c)(5).
14 45 C.F.R. § 155.315 (f)(7).
15 The exchange only moves on to Step 3 if the attested income is lower than what data sources indicate.
16 "After implementing the 60-day extension, we did not see that the extension improved these statistics" (CMS, Proposed Rule, 12963).
17 CMS, Proposed Rule, 12963
18 CMS, Proposed Rule, 13002.
19 HHS, "Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2022 and Pharmacy Benefit Manager Standards," 86 Fed. Reg. 24140, 24267 (May 5, 2021).
20 This provision amends § 147.104.
21 ACA § 2702 (42 U.S.C. §300gg-1(a)).
22 "The Market Stabilization Rule (82 FR 18346) cited third-party research and our own internal analysis showing a substantial portion of enrollees' coverage had been terminated due to non-payment of premium and, among these terminations, a large portion repurchased plans the following plan year from the same issuer." (HHS, Proposed Rule, 12951).
23 The whole time, the individuals would still technically be enrolled in the plans.
24 The Trump administration also allowed this in cases when an enrollee moved to a different insurer within the same controlled group.
25 See generally HHS, "Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2023," 87 Fed. Reg. 27208 (May 6, 2022), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/05/06/2022-09438/patient-protection-and-affordable-care-act-hhs-notice-of-benefit-and-payment-parameters-for-2023
26 CMS, Proposed Rule, 12944.
27 This provision amends § 155.305.
28 See CMS, "Failure to File and Reconcile (FTR) Operations Flexibilities for Plan Year 2023," July 18, 2022, https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/FTR-flexibilities2023.pdf
29 CMS, "Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2024," 88 Fed. Reg. 25740 (Apr. 27, 2023), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-04-27/pdf/2023-08368.pdf
30 CMS, Proposed Rule, 12961.
31 "If tax filers do not file and reconcile for two-consecutive tax years, they could have an increasing tax liability due to APTC that is not reconciled on the tax return. For example, if a tax filer had projected their household income to be less than 200 percent of the FPL but had household income over 400 percent of the FPL when filing their Federal income tax return, the requirement to repay their excess APTC could constitute a major tax liability" (CMS, Proposed Rule, 12959).
32 § 155.335
33 See CMS, "Guidance on Annual Redetermination and Re-enrollment for Marketplace Coverage for 2024 and Later Years," August 14, 2023, p. 5, https://www.cms.gov/files/document/guidance-annual-redetermination-and-re-enrollment-marketplace-coverage-2024-and-later-years.pdf
34 CMS, Proposed Rule, 12976.
35 CMS, Proposed Rule, 12969.
36 § 155.400
37 77 Fed. Reg. 18426.
38 81 Fed. Reg. 12271.
39 90 Fed. Reg. 4475-4478.
40 CMS, Proposed Rule, 12975. This process would start with an additional three-month grace period.
41 CMS, Proposed Rule, 12975.
42 CMS, Proposed Rule, 12975.
43 CMS, Proposed Rule, 12974-75.
44 § 155.410
45 86 Fed. Reg. 53412, 53430.
46 CMS, Proposed Rule, 12978.
47 CMS, Proposed Rule, 12976.
48 81 Fed. Reg. 12204.
49 81 Fed. Reg. 12204, 12274.
50 CMS, Proposed Rule, 12979.
51 CMS, Proposed Rule, 13009.
52 § 155.420.
53 87 Fed. Reg. 654 The SEP for individuals who lose minimum essential coverage.
54 87 Fed. Reg. 27208.
55 86 Fed. Reg. 53429.
56 Connect for Health Colorado, "When can I buy insurance?," https://connectforhealthco.com/get-started/when-can-i-buy-insurance/#qual-events-fl. ("For new customers only: Your household's income is at or below 150 percent of the federal poverty level ($22,590/year for an individual, $46,800/year for a family of four)."
58 Department of Treasury, “Method for Estimation of Impact of New Jersey State Subsidy Policy on Section 1332 Reinsurance Waiver 2021 Premium Tax Credit Pass-through Amount,” February 2021, https://www.cms.gov/files/document/1332-ota-methodology-addendum-nj-pass-through.pdf
59 This SEP continued to be optional for states that run their own exchanges.
60 CMS, Proposed Rule, 12946. The Trump rule argues that this SEP may violate the law, as Section 1311 of the ACA authorizes SEPs only for "circumstances similar" to a list of circumstances in statute. On its face, the 150 FPL SEP is not similar to those situations, which include life-changing events.
61 CMS, Proposed Rule, 12981.
62 CMS, Proposed Rule, 12982.
63 CMS, Proposed Rule, 12979.
64 CMS, Proposed Rule, 12982. Exchanges would not be required to verify eligibility for all SEPs, as the cost to verify eligibility for SEP-triggering events with very low volumes could be greater than the benefit of verifying eligibility for them.
65 CMS, Proposed Rule, 12985.
66 81 Fed. Reg. 94058.
67 CMS, Proposed Rule, 13003.
68 CMS, Proposed Rule, 13016.
69 CMS, Proposed Rule, 12982.
70 CMS, Proposed Rule, 13016.
71 This provision amends § 155.335.
72 "We propose to amend the automatic re-enrollment hierarchy" (CMS, Proposed Rule, 12973).
73 88 Fed. Reg. 25740.
74 CMS, Proposed Rule, 12974, note 100.
75 This provision amends § 155.20.
76 CMS, Proposed Rule, 13010.
77 89 Fed. Reg. 39392.
78 Daniel Wiessner, "US States Sue over Biden Rule Extending Health Insurance to DACA Immigrants," Reuters, August 8, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/legal/us-states-sue-over-biden-rule-extending-health-insurance-daca-immigrants-2024-08-08/
79 This provision amends § 155.220
80 CMS, Proposed Rule, 12955.
81 "[P]roof by evidence that, compared with evidence opposing it, leads to the conclusion that the fact at issue is more likely true than not" (CMS, Proposed Rule, 12955).
82 CMS, Proposed Rule, 12955.
83 This provision amends § 156.115.
84 CMS, Proposed Rule, 12985.
85 See Executive Order 14187 and Executive Order 14168.
86 This provision amends § 155.605.
87 HHS, Proposed Rule, 12987.
88 ACA § 1302(c)(4); 42 U.S.C. § 18022.
89 "We further note that after the initial years of implementation of market reforms, once the premium trend is more stable, we may propose to change our methodology. For example, we may consider changing our methodology to reflect the broader NHEA per enrollee private health insurance premium data. Additionally, as new data on health insurance premiums become available through the Exchanges and other sources, we intend to review the methodology for calculating the premium adjustment percentage" (79 Fed. Reg. 13744, 13802).
90 This provision amends §§ 156.140, 156.200, 156.400.
91 CMS, Proposed Rule, 12995. The current threshold is +/-2 percentage points. This rule would change it to +2/-4 for all non-bronze individual and small group market plans under the essential health benefits package and +5/-4 for bronze plans.
92 CMS, Proposed Rule, 13009.
93 CMS, Proposed Rule, 13025.
94 CBO, An Update to the Budget and Economic Outlook: 2024 to 2034, June 2024, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2024-06/60039-Outlook-2024.pdf
95 Peter J. Nelson, "Three Steps to Achieving More Affordable Health Insurance in the Individual Market," Health Affairs Forefront, August 19, 2021, https://www.healthaffairs.org/content/forefront/three-steps-achieving-more-affordable-health-insurance-individual-market

Related Content

Subscribe

Sign up now for your health policy updates.

This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.
Name(Required)